On January 30, 2026, OFAC designated UK registered Zedcex Exchange Ltd and Zedxion Exchange Ltd for operating in Iran’s financial sector and providing support to the IRGC. This is the first time OFAC has named digital asset exchanges for activity in Iran’s financial sector, using E.O. 13902 and E.O. 13224 to impose blocking sanctions.
OFAC also listed seven Tron wallet addresses tied to Zedcex and six high volume exchange attributed wallets to disrupt operational infrastructure. Investigators report Zedcex processed over 94 million dollars linked to IRGC related flows, with broader stablecoin activity approaching the billion dollar range. Crypto firms must immediately screen, block, and reassess exposure to affected infrastructure.
What OFAC Did And Why It Matters
The US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control escalated Iran focused sanctions to include two crypto exchange entities and their transaction infrastructure. The move targets how funds move, not only who sends or receives them. By designating the platforms and the wallets that underpin their flows, OFAC is aiming at the pipes that keep sanctions evasion running. For crypto markets, the message is clear. Stablecoin rails and Tron based pathways tied to Iran are now a priority enforcement focus.
The designations
On January 30, 2026, OFAC designated Zedcex Exchange Ltd and Zedxion Exchange Ltd. The basis includes E.O. 13902 for operating in Iran’s financial sector and E.O. 13224 for providing material support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Treasury described this as the first OFAC action against digital asset exchanges for activity in Iran’s financial sector. Investigators attribute more than 94 million dollars in IRGC linked transactions to Zedcex at peak periods, according to public and private sector analysis that underpinned the action. The agency detailed multiple exchange attributed wallets and said the exchanges processed funds for IRGC linked addresses (Treasury).
Infrastructure and wallets targeted
OFAC designated seven Tron addresses tied to Zedcex. Several overlapped with Israeli NBCTF identifications published in September 2025, indicating shared intelligence and cross border mapping of the same payment nodes. The action also sanctioned six high volume exchange attributed wallet addresses to disrupt clearing infrastructure that supported recurring flows across stablecoin corridors. The focus goes beyond single transfers to the governance, liquidity pools, and repeatable routing patterns that enable steady movement of value. That framing aligns with recent analytic reporting on Tron based stablecoin use in Iran’s sanctions evasion networks (Elliptic).
Immediate compliance impacts
All property and interests in property of the designated parties in US jurisdiction are blocked. US persons are prohibited from dealings, and the 50 percent rule applies to entities owned by the listed parties. Non US entities face heightened secondary sanctions risk if they materially assist or provide goods or services to designated actors. Screening programs must update for Tron and stablecoin paths, including sanctions alerts, automated blocks, and enhanced monitoring for address clusters tied to the exchanges. Firms with exposure to UK registered entities should evaluate beneficial ownership and control details given the named structures (CoinDesk).
Network And Beneficiaries
OFAC’s narrative frames Zedcex and Zedxion as stablecoin clearing hubs embedded in Iran’s sanctions evasion ecosystem. Their core value proposition was throughput rather than retail trading. On chain activity shows concentration on Tron based stablecoins, which provide low fees and high transaction speed. The exchanges sat in the middle of repeatable routes between mixers, brokers, and service providers that touch Iran related counterparties.
Ownership and leadership links
Reporting ties the platforms’ beneficial control to networks associated with Babak Morteza Zanjani, a sanctioned Iranian businessman known for laundering oil revenues. Zedcex maintained UK registration details while operating flows that Treasury links to Iran’s financial sector. That mix of offshore registration and Iran facing activity is consistent with how evasion networks assemble layers across jurisdictions. The designations raise legal and operational risks for any service providers that supported corporate formation, payments, or marketing for the entities.
Role in sanctions evasion
The exchanges prioritized stablecoin clearing functions over standard order books. IRGC linked flows made up a significant share of volume during peak periods, indicating preferred status for certain counterparties. On chain analysis points to concentrated routing through Tron contracts and associated stablecoin issuers, with peel chains and common ownership patterns visible across address clusters. The resulting map shows a small set of high throughput wallets acting as the core of daily liquidity movement.
Related human rights designations
Alongside the exchange actions, OFAC named seven Iranian individuals, including six tied to the IRGC and security services. The list includes Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni Kalagari and senior IRGC intelligence figures for roles in repression and abuses. This package links illicit finance, human rights violations, and regional destabilization as part of a unified pressure strategy. The combined approach increases costs for state actors by targeting both revenue generation and tools of domestic control.
The Bigger Picture For Crypto And Enforcement
This action fits a multi year pattern that targets Iran linked networks and their crypto rails. Treasury and partners have layered actions across wallets, brokers, and oil related facilitators that touch digital assets. The aim has been to disrupt revenue channels to the IRGC and associated proxies while signaling risk to intermediaries. Zedcex and Zedxion extend that strategy to the exchange layer that clears high value stablecoin flows.
Pattern across Iran and proxies
April 2025 designations hit Houthi related wallets that recorded near one billion dollars in cumulative volume. December 2024 updates targeted IRGC linked financier networks that used crypto rails for settlement and buffer liquidity. In September 2025, OFAC and partners sanctioned oil smuggling networks that benefited the IRGC Qods Force, with spillovers into crypto tracked addresses. The Zedcex and Zedxion actions bring the control point closer to the center of flow by naming the exchange entities and their key wallets.
Compliance steps for exchanges and services
- Immediately block and freeze designated addresses and entities across spot, derivatives, staking, and custody products. Update sanctions lists, travel rule screening, address clustering, and heuristic matches on Tron and stablecoin contracts.
- Leverage Chainalysis, Elliptic, and TRM Labs screening to detect overlap, peel chains, shared custodial tags, and common ownership. Enhance geofencing, KYB reviews, beneficial ownership checks, and exit plans for indirect exposure.
What to watch
- Follow on designations that map additional exchange infrastructure, operators, and service providers that keep the flows alive.
- Stablecoin issuer and custodian responses to flagged addresses and on chain pressure, including blacklist moves and freeze events.
- Cross chain migration away from Tron to alternative networks and mixers as evasion networks adapt to sanctions screening.
- Coordinated actions with Israeli NBCTF, European authorities, and UK agencies to tighten coverage across wallets, fiat gateways, and shell companies.
OFAC is moving from reactive wallet listings to proactive disruption of exchange level infrastructure tied to Iran. Expect continued mappings of Tron based stablecoin circuits, rapid updates to address lists, and scrutiny of beneficial ownership that touches Iran aligned networks. Firms should assume iterative actions and prepare to offboard counterparties that fail enhanced due diligence.
Compliance teams that operationalize list updates, cluster level analytics, and enforced blocks on stablecoin clearing paths will be positioned to contain exposure. Monitoring E.O. 13902 and E.O. 13224 activity, plus issuer level responses, will signal how quickly capital reroutes and where new chokepoints emerge.
Key Takeaways
- First OFAC designations of digital asset exchanges for Iran’s financial sector
- Zedcex and Zedxion linked to IRGC related flows with more than 94 million dollars attributed to Zedcex
- Seven Tron wallets and six exchange infrastructure wallets sanctioned to disrupt operations
- Package includes IRGC connected officials for abuses and repression
- Exchanges must enhance sanctions screening, clustering, and de risking on Tron and stablecoin flows
Related FAQs
What exactly did OFAC sanction and under which authorities?
OFAC designated Zedcex Exchange Ltd and Zedxion Exchange Ltd for operating in Iran’s financial sector under E.O. 13902 and for providing support to the IRGC under E.O. 13224. Associated wallets were also listed.
Do non US exchanges and service providers need to act?
Yes. While US obligations are primary, non US entities face secondary exposure if they materially assist designated parties. Most global firms adopt OFAC screening to avoid facilitation risk and correspondent disruptions.
Which chains and assets are implicated by this action?
The designations call out Tron addresses and stablecoin flows. Screening should cover Tron addresses, stablecoins circulating through those paths, and any linked clusters across other networks.
What are the top operational steps to reduce risk now?
Update sanctions lists, block designated addresses, apply clustering analytics, review KYB for counterparties touching Iran linked networks, and document exit plans for indirect exposure across settlement and liquidity providers.
